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19 February 1962

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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
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## DAILY BRIEF



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Disarmament Conference: There has been little favorable response from non-Communist countries to Khrushchev's proposal for a summit conference on disarmament. The East European press, in endorsing the Soviet leader's proposal, has been careful to avoid language which would rule out the possibility of a summit meeting of the four powers at a later date. In this regard, TASS commentary on the replies of President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan to Khrushchev's letter of 11 February noted that both Western leaders had indicated a preparedness to participate at an appropriate later stage of negotiations. [REDACTED]

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Laos: [REDACTED] Souvanna Phouma has reported to the Western ambassadors in Luang Prabang that Phoumi on 17 February reiterated his demands for the ministries of defense and interior. Although Souvanna stated that he had not entirely abandoned hope that Phoumi could be persuaded to modify his stand, he declared that after consulting in Khang Khay with his "colleagues," he would draft two or three alternative cabinet lists which might be acceptable to the West. He expects to visit Vientiane on 21 February for further talks with Phoumi and will present the lists to the ambassadors for scrutiny at that time.)

[REDACTED] Souvanna urged Phoumi during the talks not to counterattack at Nam Tha in the next few days, warning that there would be a "violent reaction" and that he did not have control over the Pathet Lao forces there. Although Souvanna recommended to the ambassadors that further pressure be applied on Phoumi to support a neutralist government, he cautioned against moves which might "lead Phoumi to break away and go it alone." [REDACTED]

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
Congo: [REDACTED] Tshombé has rejected the stationing of UN troops in the mining centers of Jadotville and Kolwezi, thus backtracking on a verbal commitment to the UN. U Thant has indicated to [REDACTED]

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[US and British officials in New York that it might be necessary for the UN to use force to occupy these towns. He considers occupation necessary to comply with the UN mandates against secession and mercenaries and believes that brief visits by mixed commissions are a "good beginning but far from sufficient."]

[Members of the Katanga parliament, which on 15 February "authorized" Tshombé to resume talks with Adoula aimed at reintegrating Katanga with the Congo, are reported to believe they "put one over" on the Leopoldville government by "cleverly worded conditions." The assembly insists on its right to approve or disapprove any measure imposed by the central government. Moreover, American and UN officials in Elisabethville think that Tshombé might use the meeting with Katanga's tribal chiefs in Jadotville, ostensibly convoked to explain reintegration, as a platform for "poisoned arrow speeches."]  
(Map)

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
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



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


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UN-Cuba: Mongolia intends to introduce in the 19 February plenary session of the General Assembly a moderate and vague draft resolution on Cuba's complaint of US aggressive intentions. [The American UN delegation was told by several UN delegates that the Soviets were "greatly agitated" about the defeat of the bloc draft in the Political Committee on 15 February and felt "compelled not to let the matter drop."]


The Mongolian draft consists solely of the only paragraph of the bloc resolution which was endorsed by the Political

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Committee. The paragraph recalls that it is the aim of the UN to foster equal rights, self-determination, and "noninterference in the internal affairs of any state." Forty-one UN members--Soviet bloc and most of the Afro-Asians--supported the paragraph, none voted against, and 59 members from Latin America, Western Europe, and countries allied with the US in treaties abstained.

Although endorsement by the General Assembly of such a resolution would imply some support of Cuba's charges, many of the 59 abstainers would hesitate to vote negatively on these basic principles of the UN Charter. Abstentions do not count in determining the two-thirds majority vote required for passage of the resolution.

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British Guiana: Order is being maintained with the assistance of British troops, including reinforcements sent from Britain and Jamaica, but tension persists in the capital city of Georgetown. Extensive destruction by rioting, looting, and arson has completely leveled a large area in the center of town. Premier Jagan's People's Progressive party government has retained control over the police and the support of most rural agricultural workers and has refused to resign. \*Although labor leaders were reported early today to have called off the general strike following some government concessions, Jagan's tenure in office remains uncertain. His appeal for British assistance to restore order is politically embarrassing, and the costs of restoration will further increase the economic discontent which the opposition exploited to instigate the strike. Opposition efforts now may be focused on trying to vote Jagan out by inducing defections among his small legislative majority. Jagan controls 19 of the assembly seats and the combined opposition 15.

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Responses to Khrushchev's Proposal  
On Disarmament Conference

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[ ]

While Radio Moscow has described the UAR response to the summit appeal as a tacit agreement from Nasir "to take part personally" in the conference deliberations at Geneva, press reports suggest that the UAR leader will attend the talks only if the leaders of the majority of the 18 nations concerned also agree to be present. Nehru has reportedly indicated that his preoccupation with formation of a new cabinet precludes his attendance at Geneva. The death of Haile Selassie's wife last week would seem to rule out the Emperor's presence at any heads-of-government meeting on 14 March. [Burma's U Nu, while warning of the adverse effects of any explicit rejection of Khrushchev's proposal, is also apparently waiting for the decision of other nations involved.]

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[ ]

TASS reports that Swedish Premier Erlander will attend a summit meeting "if such a procedure has the general support of states attending the session, including the big military powers." Brazil has informed Khrushchev that it believes the March meeting should be opened by the foreign ministers. If the meeting "shows progress" Brazil would "not exclude the possibility" of being represented at a higher level. Mexican President Lopez Mateos will also probably not attend the conference before some progress has been shown. [ ]

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